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This paper illustrates two formulas for assessing independence
risk based on the Bayesian and belief-functions frameworks.
These formulas can be used to assess the role of threats to
auditor independence as well as the role of threat-mitigating
safeguards. Also, these formulas provide a basis for evaluation
of an audit firm’s independence risk and a framework to
educate stakeholders about the threats faced by the audit
firm and the role of effective safeguards in mitigating these
risks. The formulas also provide a means for regulators and
lawmakers to evaluate whether they have effective safeguards
in place given the existence of threats and for auditors to signal
to various stakeholders that they have identified significant
threats and have effective safeguards in place. To show
the potential usefulness of these analytical models, several
illustrations addressing increased transparency and the
potential impact of regulations are presented.
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probability theory, belief functions
SUMMARY
The enactment of significant new regulations and
laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),
and the severe penalties recently being imposed
on audit firms highlight the importance of
auditor independence to the profession. Auditor
independence, both in fact and in appearance, is
vital to the value of attest services and thus to the
viability of the auditing profession. Independent
auditors have an important public trust in that
investors must be able to rely on issuers’ financial
statements. If investors do not believe that an
auditor is independent of an audit client, little
confidence will be derived from the auditor’s
opinion and the investor will be less likely to invest
in that company’s securities (SEC, 2001). In
testimony before the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Ralph Whitworth, Managing
Member, Relational Investors LLC, argued that
‘[A]uditor independence goes to the very essence
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of our capital markets, and it’s linked inextricably
to the efficiencies of our capitalist system’ (SEC,
2000).
Given that auditor independence is critical, there
is a need for a means to measure and control the
risk that independence may be impaired. That risk,
defined as independence risk, is the risk that
threats to auditor independence, to the extent that
they are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise
or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an
auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions
about the financial statements of a specific attest
client (ISB, 2000).
To date, an analytical formula for auditor
independence risk that facilitates assessment of that
risk has not existed. The objective of this paper is
to present and illustrate analytical formulas of
independence risk that are based on an existing
general framework. As these formulas are based
on two analytical approaches, Bayesian inference
and Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions
(Shafer, 1976), they provide a level of rigor to
the assessment of independence risk not
previously available. Importantly, we include in
each formulation the three components of an
‘independence risk triangle’ similar in form to that
implied for fraud in SAS No. 99, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2002).
The basis for model development is the
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)
framework. This framework is intended to assist
the auditor in identifying threats to independence,
to evaluate the significance of those threats, and to
identify and apply effective safeguards to eliminate
the threats or reduce them to an acceptable level
(IFAC, 2008). Our model expands this framework
by adding factors related to opportunities for the
auditor to act in a manner biased toward the audit
client and factors related to the possibility of the
auditor possessing an inappropriate attitude
toward compliance with ethics rules related to
independence.
The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct indicates
that independence is evaluated with respect to a
particular attest client (AICPA, 2005). Accordingly,
our model measures the risk of impaired
independence at the engagement level. However,
individual measures of independence risk can
be aggregated to determine an overall level of
independence for an entire audit firm and even for
the profession as a whole. This flexibility provides
a basis for regulators to evaluate whether they
have effective safeguards in place, for audit firm
self-assessments of independence risk, and as a
basis to educate audit staff about the threats faced
by the firm and by individual auditors. The model
also can provide a means for auditors to signal
to financial markets that they have identified
significant threats and have effective safeguards
in place.
While the IFAC framework identifies threats that
may affect independence risk, it does not offer
a methodology for combining judgments about
the level of threats identified or the effectiveness
of safeguards related to those threats. An initial
attempt at providing such a methodology was
presented in previous work by Turner et al. (2002).
However, the Turner et al. study uses a simplistic
version of the model presented in this paper and
does not derive an analytical formula. The prior
model also does not explicitly consider the
possibility of interactions among the key variables
that affect independence, nor does it explicitly
consider the effect of regulation or of transparency
on the perceived risk of impaired independence.
The remainder of this paper begins with a review
of relevant prior research on auditor independence.
We then develop our overall model that identifies
the threats and safeguards associated with auditor
attitude, incentives for bias, opportunities for
bias to occur, and interrelationships between
those three factors. Next, we develop two formulas
for independence risk assessment, one based on
Bayesian theory and a second based on the
Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions. To
demonstrate the use of each formula, we provide
illustrations of the risk assessment process
considering several different scenarios. In the final
section, we provide a summary and provide
recommendations for future research.
PRIOR RESEARCH
Several branches of research examine aspects of
auditor independence. One substantial branch
investigates auditor self-interest threats to
independence resulting from the provision of
non-audit services. Some studies, such as Frankel
et al. (2002), find evidence that the provision of
non-audit services is correlated with evidence
of more aggressive earnings management in
audited financial statements. Other studies, such as
DeFond et al. (2002), Jenkins & Krawczyk (2002),
Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Chung & Kallapur (2003),
and Brandon et al. (2004), fail to find such
correlations. Reynolds et al. (2004) find evidence
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supporting Frankel et al. (2002), but determine
that the correlations are situational. The perception
of a self-interest threat, however, remains for
regulators to the extent that SOX prohibits auditors
from providing certain non-audit services to
publicly-traded audit clients.
Another branch of research (e.g. Antle et al., 1997;
Burke, 1997; Shafer et al., 1999) investigates the
impact of intrinsic and extrinsic factors affecting
the willingness of an auditor to comply with or
violate independence guidelines. While these
studies generally reflect a positive perception of
auditor integrity, outside observers may perceive
that self-interest or other threats may cause an
auditor to ignore potential punishments and allow
independence to be impaired.
The environment in which auditors function
also has been studied. Ryan et al. (2001) examine
SEC rules on independence, while Glazer &
Jaenicke (2002) provide details of how the SEC
elected to continue with rules-based independence
requirements rather than accepting a principles-
based code. Shafer et al. (1999) investigate auditors’
perceptions of the effectiveness of formal sanctions
as incentives for maintaining independence. The
results of their experimental study indicate that
litigation risk and peer-review risk were perceived
as significant deterrents to aggressive reporting
decisions, but the risk of disciplinary action by
professional organizations was not. Hodge (2003)
investigates investors’ perceptions of earnings
quality, auditor independence, and the usefulness
of audited financial information. He finds that
perceived earnings quality for all publicly-traded
firms has declined over time, as has perceived
auditor independence and the perceived reliability
of audited financial information.
Several studies have proposed new approaches
to defining auditor independence. Johnstone et al.
(2001), for example, present a framework
reflecting the combined effects on independence
risk of direct incentives, indirect incentives, and
judgment-based decisions involving difficult
accounting issues, materiality, and audit conduct.
They identify a variety of factors that may mitigate
independence risk, including corporate
governance mechanisms, regulatory oversight,
auditing firm policies, auditing firm culture, and
individual auditor characteristics. Taylor et al.
(2003) also propose a general framework focusing
on auditor reliability rather than solely on auditor
independence. Their framework includes three
foundational elements to control subjectivity in
auditors’ judgments and decisions: independence,
integrity, and expertise. Each element is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for maximizing
objectivity, but objectivity, in turn, is a necessary
and sufficient condition for achieving and
maintaining reliability in fact and appearance.
One basis for the Taylor et al. framework is the
argument that because auditors are paid by the
audit clients, an auditor always has the potential
not to be independent. The Taylor et al. framework
is intended to allow less than perfect independence
as long as auditor reliability is sufficient. Like
Johnstone et al. (2001), Taylor et al. (2003) do not
attempt to operationalize their framework.
Turner et al. (2002) present a formal model of
independence risk that assesses the impact of three
variables – Incentives, Opportunity and Integrity –
and various safeguards on independence risk. The
key element of their model is an assessment of
the belief that independence is maintained, given
beliefs about the three variables affecting this belief
and evidence concerning various factors mitigating
this belief. The assessment of independence risk is
operationalized through an evidential network and
risk assessments based on the theory of belief
functions (Shafer, 1976). Although a first step at
formally modeling independence risk, their model
is quite simplistic as it does not model possible
interactions between the variables, nor does it
attempt to explicitly assess either the impact of
additional regulations or safeguards or the impact
of greater transparency with respect to audit firm
policies and procedures that attempt to limit
independence risk. This paper attempts to remedy
these limitations. Importantly, it extends the
previous model significantly by also developing a
Bayesian model of the auditor independence risk
with the same level of conceptual complexities.
Some will find a Bayesian formulation to be more
familiar and to be easier to use to augment the risk
assessment tools they currently utilize.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING
INDEPENDENCE RISK
In this section we develop a general framework
for assessing auditor independence risk. The
framework is then used as a basis for development
of analytical formulas for the assessment of auditor
independence risk.
In the United States, the organizations
responsible for establishing guidelines for auditor
independence – the American Institute of Certified
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Public Accountants (AICPA), the SEC, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) –
each have decided that a general framework based
on threats and safeguards may not be effective
and, instead, rely on approaches that list rules
where specific actions either are required or are
prohibited (see, e.g., Ryan et al., 2001; Bloom &
Myring, 2002; Glazer & Jaenicke, 2002).
In 2000, the Independence Standards Board
produced an exposure draft, Statement of
Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for
Auditor Independence (ISB, 2000), proposing a
framework and model for independence risk
consistent with current international standards.
That framework and model were rejected by the
SEC in favor of continuing the existing rules-based
approach (Glazer & Jaenicke, 2002).
The existing rules-based approach also is evident
in the provisions of SOX, which includes both
specific prohibitions, such as the provision of some,
but not all, non-audit services, and specific
requirements, such as audit partner rotation.
Knowing what the rules are may not be satisfactory,
as Arthur Andersen LLP found out, when a firm
is (or regulators are) attempting to monitor
independence risk. And, because rules tend to
be added on an ‘as-needed’ basis in response
to specific circumstances, development of a
parsimonious model for independence risk that is
rules-based is problematic.
Alternatively, much of the auditing community
outside the United States has elected to use a
threat/safeguard, principles-based framework for
defining and assessing auditor independence. The
threat/safeguard approach adopted by the IFAC
has been accepted in many countries, including
Australia, Canada and Great Britain and is detailed
in the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants
included in the 2008 Handbook of Auditing,
Assurance, and Ethics Pronouncements (IFAC, 2008).
Identified in the framework are five categories
of threats: self-interest threats, self-review threats,
advocacy threats, familiarity threats, and
intimidation threats (¶100.10).
When significant threats are identified, the
framework indicates that effective safeguards
should be identified and applied to eliminate the
threats or reduce them to an acceptable level.
Framework safeguards fall into two broad
categories (¶100.11): safeguards created by the
profession, legislation, or regulation, and
safeguards within the work environment. Each
of these safeguard categories includes numerous
ways of reducing or eliminating threats to auditor
independence.
As a basis for a formal model of auditor
independence risk, we posit that the issuance of a
biased auditor’s report is analogous to the creation
of fraudulent financial statements by a company’s
management. That is, by intentionally issuing
an inappropriate opinion, the auditor is falsely
representing that he or she believes that the
accompanying financial statements are presented
fairly in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. Such a misrepresentation
potentially meets the legal requirements for fraud –
that there is an intentional false representation of a
material fact and there may be justifiable reliance
and possible loss or injury based on the false
representation.
As discussed in SAS No. 99, three conditions
generally are present when fraud exists:
incentives/pressures, attitudes/rationalizations,
and opportunities (¶33). If auditor bias can be
considered a form of fraud, the same three
conditions should be present if an auditor
intentionally issues an inappropriate audit opinion.
For brevity, these components are identified
hereafter as Incentive, Attitude, and Opportunity.
Turner et al. (2002) develop a model of
independence risk integrating the three
components identified in SAS No. 99. We use the
same three components, creating an ‘independence
triangle’ similar to the ‘fraud triangle’ envisioned
in SAS No. 99. We then extend the Turner et al.
model by integrating the threats and safeguards
included in the 2008 Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants (IFAC, 2008). We elect to use a threats
and safeguards approach as this allows
development of a more general model in which
independence risk can be evaluated either in a
principles-based regulatory environment or a
more situational, rules-based environment. This
approach also allows inclusion of additional threats
and safeguards not identified either in the
principles-based international standards or the
rules-based US standards. Importantly, we enhance
the model by adding three interrelationships,
one between Incentive and Attitude, a second
relationship between Attitude and Opportunity,
and a third between Incentive and Opportunity.
The complete model is shown in Figure 1.
While no empirical data identifying which threat
categories are related to a specific independence
triangle component currently exists, we present
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relationships that appear logical. It should be noted
that categories for threats are general in nature and
may not be mutually exclusive. For example, one
type of threat might logically be assigned to more
than one general category. The threats identified
are for illustrative purposes only; however, we
believe that such classification issues or possible
interrelationships between threat categories do not
affect the general structure of our model.
Incentives
Five categories of threats relate to Incentives:
self-interest threats, self-review threats, advocacy
threats, familiarity threats, and intimidation
threats. Examples of self-interest threats include
having a financial interest in a client, undue
dependence on fees from a client, and potential
employment with a client (IFAC, 2008, ¶200.4).
Circumstances that may create self-review threats
include having prepared the original data used to
generate records that are the subject-matter of the
engagement, reporting on the operation of financial
systems after being involved in their design or
implementation, and a member of the assurance
team being, or having recently been, a director or
officer of the client (IFAC, 2008, ¶200.5). Advocacy
threats include acting as an advocate on behalf of
an assurance client in litigation or disputes with
third parties, and promoting ownership or other
interests in an entity when that entity is a financial
statement audit client (IFAC, 2008, ¶200.6).
Circumstances that may create familiarity threats
include a member of the engagement team having
a close or immediate family relationship with a
director or officer of the client, accepting gifts or
preferential treatment from a client, unless the
value is clearly insignificant, and long association
of senior personnel with the assurance client
(IFAC, 2008, ¶200.7). Intimidation threats include
being threatened with dismissal or replacement,
being threatened with litigation, and being
pressured to reduce inappropriately the extent of
work performed in order to reduce fees (IFAC,
2008, ¶200.8). Each of these threats potentially
creates an incentive for the auditor to provide
R1
R2
• Financial interests in client 
• Loan to or from client 
• Undue dependence on fee 
• Concern over losing engagement 
• Close business relationships 
• Potential employment 
• Contingent fees 
• Family and personal relationships 
• Long association of senior audit 
personnel with assurance clients 
• Gifts/hospitality from clients 
• Reviewing auditors’ own work 
previously done for client 
• Auditor previously director, officer, or 
influential employee  of client
•  Existence of errors or fraud
•  Accounting  issues requiring judgment
•  Selection of audit procedures 
•  Interpretation of evidence 
• Materiality choice
•  Actual or  threatened litigation 
•  Threat of replacement 
•  Pressure to reduce work 
performed  to reduce fees 
•  Promoting securities of client 
•  Client advocate in litigation or 
disputes with third parties 
• Inability to resist intimidation threats or other 
demands of dominating client personnel 
• Willingness to ignore or inappropriately 
interpret laws and regulations 
• Cultural differences in moral codes 
* Safeguards 
• Safeguards created by the 
profession, legislation or regulation 
• Safeguards within the work 
environment 
Self-interest 
threats
 Auditor is biased 
(B)
Incentive
Attitude
Opportunity
Threat
Threat
Threat
Advocacy 
threats
Intimidation
threats
Familiarity
threats
Self-review 
threats
Threat due to auditor 
characteristics 
Threat due to auditee 
characteristics 
Threat due to audit 
program judgments 
Safeguards* 
Safeguards* 
Safeguards* 
R3
AND
Figure 1: Model of independence risk (risk that the auditor is biased) with examples.
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an auditor’s report containing an inappropriate
opinion.
Attitude/rationalization (integrity)
The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants
notes that a distinguishing mark of the auditing
profession is its acceptance of the responsibility to
act in the public interest and not exclusively to
satisfy the needs of an individual client or employer
(IFAC, 2008, ¶100.1). In acting in the public interest,
i.e., being independent, a professional accountant
should observe and comply with five fundamental
principles of professional ethics: integrity,
objectivity, professional competence and due care,
confidentiality, and professional behavior (IFAC,
2008, ¶100.4). Burke (1997) notes that there are
both positive and negative intrinsic and extrinsic
motivators that affect an auditor’s desire and effort
to maintain independence. Auditor interviews
conducted by Burke indicate that intrinsic
motivators are central to the auditor’s commitment
to maintain an objective and independent approach
when working with audit clients. Burke also notes
that while the potential for positive rewards
engenders a strong sense of commitment to
maintaining independence, potential punishments
associated with not maintaining independence
ensure a high level of compliance with the
profession’s rules and the firm’s policies and
procedures established to promote auditor
independence.
Auditor characteristics and attitude
toward independence
Even though both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators
toward independence may exist, the attitude of an
auditor still may threaten independence. Often,
management personnel of audit clients have been
successful at least in part due to the ability to
dominate others. If the personality of the auditor
is not sufficiently strong, demands by dominating
audit client personnel may result in the auditor
allowing inappropriate information to be included
in or appropriate information excluded from
financial statements.
Other characteristics of the auditor also may
result in a threat to Attitude. While the audit
profession excludes known criminals, an
individual with weak moral character still may
become an auditor. Such individuals may have
a greater propensity to ignore or inappropriately
interpret laws, regulations or professional
standards and thus allow his or her independence
to become impaired.
Many accounting ethics studies use Kohlberg’s
theory of ethical development (Kohlberg, 1971),
which posits that individuals who have achieved
a higher level of ethical development can be
expected to behave in a more ethical manner.
Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1986a,b)
has been the primary tool for measuring ethical
development under Kohlberg’s theory with a
higher level of development indicated by a higher
p-score. In the United States, it has been found that
p-scores of accountants tend to decrease as rank
increases (that is, partners, on average, have lower
p-scores than do managers and seniors) (Ponemon,
1992; Shaub, 1994). Ethical development has also
been linked to auditor sensitivity to management
competence and integrity (Ponemon, 1993), auditor
resistance to management pressure to misstate
financial statement numbers (Tsui & Gul, 1995),
whistle-blowing attributions (Ponemon, 1990),
auditor underreporting of time (Ponemon, 1992),
auditor objectivity (Ponemon, 1995), and auditor
independence judgments (Ponemon, 1990).
Opportunity
Even if an auditor is presented with a desirable
incentive and is inclined to seek that incentive,
an opportunity for auditor bias must exist.
Opportunities may be available through choice of
audit procedures to perform, interpretation of
audit evidence, decisions regarding appropriate
application of GAAP, and the choice of reporting
materiality and implementation of that choice in
deciding to waive recording of misstatements.
Other opportunities such as the existence of known
or likely errors, identified earnings manipulation
and fraud also may exist.
Safeguards
When significant threats are identified, effective
safeguards should be identified and applied with
the nature of the safeguards depending on the
circumstances. Consideration should always be
given to what a reasonable and informed third
party, having knowledge of all relevant
information, including safeguards applied, would
reasonably conclude to be unacceptable. The
consideration will be affected by matters such as
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the significance of the threat, the nature of the attest
engagement, the intended users of the auditor’s
report, and the structure of the firm (IFAC, 2008,
¶200.11). The two categories of safeguards are
safeguards created by the profession, legislation
or regulation, and safeguards within the work
environment comprised of firm-wide safeguards
and engagement-specific safeguards. Examples of
firm-wide safeguards include such actions as
policies and procedures to implement and monitor
quality control of engagements, policies and
procedures to enable identification of interests or
relationships between the firm or members of
engagement teams and clients, and policies and
procedures to monitor and manage the reliance
on revenue received from a single client.
Engagement-specific safeguards may include
involving an additional professional accountant
to review the work done or otherwise advise as
necessary and rotating senior assurance team
personnel. Other examples of work environment
safeguards are identified in the Code of Ethics for
Professional Accountants (IFAC, 2008, ¶200.12,
¶200.13).
Interrelationships
A determination of an actual impairment of
independence implies that all three main
components of the independence risk triangle
are present. However, a perception of impaired
independence, for example lack of public
confidence, can result from observations about
only one or two of the three components while the
other component(s) remain unobserved. This is
recognized in SAS No. 1, which states, ‘Public
confidence would be impaired by evidence that
independence was actually lacking, and it might
also be impaired by the existence of circumstances
which reasonable people might believe likely to
influence independence’ (AICPA, 1972, AU 220.03).
In recognizing the importance of perception,
the SEC states, ‘Because objectivity rarely can be
observed directly, investor confidence in auditor
independence rests in large measure on investor
perception’ (SEC, 2001, ¶ III-A). The SEC also
notes:
It is therefore not enough that financial
statements be accurate; the public must also
perceive them as being accurate. Public faith
in the reliability of a corporation’s financial
statements depends upon the public perception
of the outside auditor as an independent
professional. . . . If investors were to view the
auditor as an advocate for the corporate client,
the value of the audit function itself might well
be lost (SEC, 2001, ¶ III-A).
We model perception of independence
impairment by including three interrelationships
between threat components of the independence
risk triangle. These interrelationships allow
assessments about any threat to propagate to each of
the other threats without actual evidence about the
other threats being necessary. In Figure 1, the three
main categories of independence risk factors are
connected by three relationships – one between
‘Incentive’ and ‘Attitude’, depicted by R1, a second
between ‘Attitude’ and ‘Opportunity’, depicted
by R2, and a third between ‘Incentive’ and
‘Opportunity’, depicted by R3.
Each of these relationships is bidirectional in its
influence. For example, in the case of R1, if there
is evidence that the auditor has an Incentive to
allow his or her judgment to be biased, then this
relationship implies that the auditor’s Attitude
may rationalize the impairment of independence.
Similarly, if there is evidence that the auditor has
an inappropriate Attitude, this relationship implies
that the auditor may identify or create an Incentive
to his or her benefit. This relationship also implies
that if the auditor does not have an inappropriate
Attitude, the effect of Incentives for bias is negated
or if there is no Incentive, the auditor would behave
without bias. These relationships are modeled
in the respective frameworks (Bayesian and
belief-function frameworks) discussed below.
To derive the formulas for assessing the auditor
independence risk under the two frameworks, we
first simplify the general framework in Figure 1
into the evidential diagram shown in Figure 2.
An evidential diagram, in general, is a schematic
representation of the variables involved in a
problem domain with their interrelationships,
and the corresponding evidence that provides
knowledge about the states or values of the
variables (see, e.g., Srivastava & Mock, 2000; and
Sun et al., 2006). Usually such knowledge is only
partial, that is the knowledge contains uncertainty,
and thus one needs a language for managing
uncertainty to map this knowledge. Shafer &
Tversky (1985) argue that choosing a framework
for managing uncertainty is like choosing a ‘formal
language’ or ‘semantic’. The choice of a framework
depends on the nature of uncertainty involved
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in the decision problem. In the present discussion
we use two appropriate frameworks: the Bayesian
framework and the belief-function framework. The
Bayesian framework is the basis for most studies
of decision-making under uncertainty. However,
there exists a significant amount of research in
decision-making using belief functions (e.g.,
Jaffray, 1989, 1994; Yager, 1990; Nguyen & Walker,
1994). Although the belief-function (BF) framework
has had limited application in auditing and
accounting (Srivastava & Mock, 2000; Sun et al.,
2006), its use in other disciplines is growing,
especially in assessing risks (see, e.g., Chen et al.,
1992; McBurney & Parsons, 2002; Démotier et al.,
2003).
Figure 2 represents a simplified evidential
diagram of Figure 1. The rounded boxes represent
variables that take on two states or values such
as whether or not the variable ‘Incentives (I)’ is
present. The rectangular boxes represent items
of evidence pertaining to the variables to which
they are connected, and the circles represent
relationships among the linked variables. To
simplify the conceptual framework in Figure 1, we
combine all the information about threats related
to a variable into one item of evidence and all
information about safeguards pertaining to a
variable in another item of evidence.
The main variable of interest is the variable or
assertion that ‘The auditor is biased (B)’ or in other
words, the auditor lacks independence. This
variable has two states or values, ‘yes, the auditor
is biased and lacks independence’ represented by
the symbol ‘b’, and ‘the auditor is not biased’
represented by ‘~b’. Thus all variables are assumed
to be binary. We use upper case letters to represent
the names of the variables and lower case letters to
represent their values. For example, I represents
incentives, ‘i’ represents that the incentives are
present and ‘~i’ represents that the incentives are
not present.
As discussed earlier, the variable B is related to
the three variables I, A, and O through an ‘AND’
relationship. The ‘AND’ relationship means that
the auditor is biased if and only if there is incentive
for the auditor to be biased, the auditor has attitude
to be biased, and there are opportunities to be
biased. In mathematical terms, we can express the
‘AND’ relationship between ‘B’ and ‘I’, ‘A’, and
‘O’ as b = i∧a∧o, where the symbol ∧ represents
conjunction.1 Because of the interrelationships
within an evidential diagram, one can infer
knowledge about one variable from the knowledge
of the other variables. For example, knowledge
about the presence or absence of the three
variables, I, A, and O, tells us something about
 
  
Incentive (I) 
Attitude (A) 
Opportunity (O) 
Auditor is 
biased (B)
Evidence of threats that impact
 incentives (ETI)
AND 
R
1
R
2
R
3
Evidence of safeguards 
that impact incentives (ESI)
Evidence of threats that impact
 attitude (ETA)
Evidence of safeguards 
that impact attitude (ESA)
Evidence of threats that impact
 opportunities (ETO)
Evidence of safeguards 
that impact opportunities (ESO)
Figure 2: Evidential diagram for independence risk (i.e. state ‘B’, auditor is biased).
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the presence or absence of the variable B. In our
formulations, this knowledge is represented in
terms of probabilities and conditional probabilities
or likelihood ratios under the Bayesian framework
and in terms of basic belief masses (m-values) under
the belief-function framework.
FORMULAS FOR INDEPENDENCE
RISK ASSESSMENT
In developing our independence risk model under
the Bayesian framework, we use the definition of
risk as the posterior probability that the auditor
will be biased in his or her judgment given
evidence that the auditor has incentives, has an
attitude to compromise, and has opportunities to
be biased. Under the belief-function framework,
we use the notion of risk contained in the
Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions (BF) as
proposed by Srivastava and Shafer (1992) in terms
of plausibility of the auditor being biased. The
BF notion of risk is useful in situations such as
the evaluation of independence risk where the
evaluation must be made with limited information
and when use of a Bayesian approach may be
problematic due to lack of information.
In situations of limited information, and thus
significant uncertainly about the probability that
independence may be impaired; the belief function
definition of risk is used to define risk as the
plausibility of impaired independence. From this
perspective, both direct evidence that would allow
the assessor to question independence and
ambiguity as to whether independence may be
impaired or not is assigned to independence risk.
This operationalization provides a conservative
assessment of the risk in the sense that the highest
assessment of this risk is used given both the
evidence and ambiguity that exists. A lower
assessment of independence risk may not be in the
best interest of a profession that is striving to
enhance its image.2
Independence risk assessment formula under
the Bayesian framework
In this section we present the auditor
independence risk assessment formula which is
based on the Bayesian framework and assessments
of probability. To derive this formula, we must
identify all the probability information relevant
in the problem domain as depicted in Figure 2,
combine this information, and determine the
posterior probability that the auditor is biased
(lacks independence). This represents the auditor
independence risk. The derivation of the formula
is detailed in Srivastava et al. (2009) and is based
on an analytical approach presented in Shenoy &
Shafer (1990) where the probability information is
expressed in terms of probability potentials. A list
of symbols and their description is given in Table 1.
From Srivastava et al. (2009), the following
posterior probability represents the formula for
auditor independence risk in terms of prior
odds, p’s, likelihood ratios,3 l’s, and the
interrelationships among the three factors, r’s:
Auditor Independence Risk AIR Bayes
P b E E E E E ETI SI TA SA TO SO
= ( )
= ( )
= DI A O I A O Bρ ρ ρ λ λ λ π π π π1 2 3
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And the prior odds, p’s, are defined as:
π π
π π
I A
O B
P i P i , P a P a ,  
P o P o , P b P b .
= ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )
= ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )
∼ ∼
∼ ∼ (3)
Equation (1) provides the auditor independence
risk formula under Bayesian theory. The numerator
in Equation (1) determines the impact on B of
all the evidence gathered related to I, A, and O.
The denominator D consists of eight terms (D1,
D2, . . . D8) as a result of Bayes’ rule of
conditioning. Thus, there are eight possible
situations when the auditor will be biased or not
biased as determined by the presence or absence of
variables I, A, and O.
In general, the likelihood ratio, lX, say for a
variable X, is defined in terms of the conditional
probabilities as: lX = P(E|x)/P(E|~x), and
indicates (measures) the strength of the evidence E
in support of the variable X (Edwards, 1984). lX = 1
implies that the evidence provides no information
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about the presence or absence of the variable X. A
positive value greater than 1 (• > lX > 1) implies
that evidence supports that the variable X is true,
i.e., there is some reason to believe that X is true. A
value of less than one (1 > lX  0) implies that the
evidence negates the variable. Theoretically, an
infinitely large positive value of a likelihood ratio
implies that the variable is true with probability 1.0.
For example, lI → • implies that we are certain the
auditor has Incentive and a value of 0, i.e., lI = 0,
implies, with certainty, that the auditor has no
Incentive.
The interrelationships, r1, r2, and r3, determine
the strength of the relationship among the three
factors. A value of 1.0 represents the strongest
relationship implying that if one variable is present
then the other related variable is present also. A
value of 0.5 represents no relationship between the
variables. These relationships are symmetric and
are defined as: r1 = P(a|i) = P(~a|~i), r2 = P(o|a) =
P(~o|~a), and r3 = P(i|o) = P(~i|~o) (see Srivastava
et al., 2009, for more details).
Formulas for the belief and plausibility
of the auditor being biased under
belief functions
In this section we present formulas for the
evidential diagram depicted in Figure 2 based on
the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions
(Shafer, 1976) for assessing auditor independence
risk and the belief that the auditor lacks
independence (is biased). For comparison
purposes, we use the same evidential diagram as
was used in the Bayesian case.
To derive the auditor independence risk formula
and the formula for the belief that the auditor is
biased, we first determine the impacts of safeguard
factors on threat factors and then the impact of
threat factors on the corresponding variables I, A,
and O, in Figure 2, in terms of m-values, i.e.,
in terms of basic belief masses.4 Next, we combine
the three sets of m-values (one set for each
variable) obtained in the above process taking
into consideration the interrelationships among the
Table 1: List of symbols and their descriptions
Symbol Description
A represents the variable ‘Attitude’.
B represents the variable ‘Risk of Impaired Independence’, i.e., Bias against independence.
I represents the variable ‘Incentive’.
O represents the variable ‘Opportunity’.
ETI represents the evidence that threats related to incentives (I) are present.
ESI represents the evidence that safeguards related to incentives (I) are present.
ETA represents the evidence that threats related to attitude (A) are present.
ESA represents the evidence that safeguards related to attitude (A) are present.
ETO represents the evidence that threats related to opportunities (I) are present.
ESO represents the evidence that safeguards related to opportunities (O) are present.
r1, r2, r3, r determines the strength of the interrelationship between two variables under the Bayesian
framework. A value of 1.0 represents the highest strength and 0.5 represents no
interrelationship. r1 is for the relationship between I and A, r2 for the relationship between A
and O, and r3 for the relationship between O and I.
r1, r2, r3, r determines the strength of the interrelationship between two variables under the
belief-function framework. A value of 1.0 represents the highest strength and 0 represents no
interrelationship. r1 is for the relationship between I and A, r2 for the relationship between A
and O, and r3 for the relationship between O and I.
lI, lA, lO, l is the likelihood ratio which represents the strength of evidence under the Bayesian
framework. It is defined as the ratio of two conditional probabilities. For example,
l I, = P(E|i)/P(E|~i), where E represent the evidence.
m..+ The basic belief mass, i.e., m-value, in support of the variable denoted by the subscript.
m..− The basic belief mass, i.e., m-value, against the variable denoted by the subscript.
m..Θ The basic belief mass, i.e., m-value, representing unassigned beliefs or ambiguity.
Pl(i) Plausibility or risk that Incentives are present due to threat factors.
Pl(a) Plausibility or risk that Attitude to be biased is present due to threat factors.
Pl(o) Plausibility or risk that Opportunities are present due to threat factors.
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factors, R1, R2, and R3, and the ‘AND’ relationship
between B and the three variables, I, A, and O. We
then propagate the resulting m-values to B. The
above process yields the desired formulas for
the auditor independence risk and belief that the
auditor is biased. The details of the derivation are
presented in Srivastava et al. (2007).
The two most important functions that would
be useful in assessing whether the auditor is biased
or not are the overall belief, Bel(b), and overall
plausibility, Pl(b), that the auditor is biased. The
belief that the auditor is biased, Bel(b), measures
the definite belief in ‘b’ based on all the observed
evidence. The plausibility that the auditor is biased,
Pl(b), the worst case scenario, is defined to be the
sum of the definite belief in ‘b’ plus the ambiguity
existing in any unevaluated evidence.
From Srivastava et al. (2007), we obtain the
following expression for the belief and plausibility
that the auditor is biased in terms of the strength
of three interrelationships, r1, r2, and r3, and the
belief masses, m.+, m.−, and m.Θ, representing,
respectively, the level of support in favor of the
variable, against the variables, and the unassigned
belief, for the three variables I, A, and O,
represented by the subscript:
Bel b m m m r r r r m m m
r r r r m m
I A O 1 I A O
1 I A
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+ + + + +
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The interrelationship ‘r’ determines the strength
of the relationship between two variables being
related under the belief-function framework.
Similar to the definition of an interrelationship in a
Bayesian framework, this relationship is symmetric
and a value of 1.0 represents the strongest
relationship. This implies that if one variable is true
then the other also is true. A value of 0 for ‘r’
implies no relationship. The symbol r1 represents
the strength of the interrelationship between I and
A, r2 between A and O, and r3 between O and I.
Equation (5) is the desired auditor independence
risk formula and can be simplified further by
substituting m m Pl iI I+ +( ) = ( )Θ , m m Pl aA A+ +( ) = ( )Θ ,
and m m Pl oO O+ +( ) = ( )Θ , where Pl(i), Pl(a), and
Pl(o) represent the plausibility that incentives,
attitude and opportunities are present even after
considering the effect of the corresponding
safeguards. That is, these plausibilities represent
the risk that the corresponding factors are present.
Thus, from (5) we can rewrite the auditor
independence risk in terms of the plausibility of the
auditor being biased as AIR(DS):
AIR DS Pl b Pl i Pl a Pl o K( ) = ( ) = ( )⋅ ( )⋅ ( ) (7)
where K is defined in (6), which depends on the
interrelationships among the three factors, I, A, and
O.
Equation (7) is a general formula for
independence risk measured in terms of
plausibility based on Figure 2. Various special cases
can be derived from this general model. Note that
(7) is a multiplicative model consisting of the
product of three plausibilities or risk measures. The
first term Pl(i) determines the risk or plausibility
that incentives for the auditor to be biased are
present even after considering the effects of the
related safeguards. Similarly, the other two terms,
Pl(a) and Pl(o), respectively, determine the risk that
an inappropriate attitude is present, and that
opportunities are present even after considering
the effects of the corresponding safeguards.
Equation (7) makes logical sense. Auditor
independence risk will exist if the following risks
exist at the same time: incentives are present, an
inappropriate auditor attitude is present, and
opportunities for the auditor to be biased are
present.
ILLUSTRATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF
THE MODELS
To demonstrate the use of each formula, we first
consider the impact of interrelationships on the
two formulations of independence risk. Next, we
analyze the impact of transparency of actions the
auditor may take to enforce independence and
analyze the impact of regulations on independence
risk assessments. For comparison purposes, we use
the same inputs in both frameworks by converting
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the belief inputs in DS theory to probabilities
and conditional probabilities in the Bayesian
framework using the Cobb & Shenoy (2003)
approach.5
Impact of the strength of interrelationships
on auditor independence risk
Figure 3 assumes the three interrelationships to
be equal and plots the two models of auditor
independence risk as a function of the strength of
the interrelationships. As expected, independence
risk in both cases increases with the increase in
strength of the interrelationships. Given the same
inputs for both models, the models show very
similar trends and both are sensitive to
assessments that would lead the auditor or any
stakeholder to expect a stronger interrelationship
between Incentive, Opportunity or Attitude. Also,
independence risk defined under DS is more
conservative (assessed higher) than the risk defined
under Bayesian theory, especially at lower levels of
interrelationships.
The difference between the independence risks
under the two frameworks can be large, especially
at a lower strength of interrelationships. This
difference results from the way the two
frameworks model ambiguity. In the probability
framework, if it is not known whether a variable
is true or false, a probability of 0.5 can be assigned
to each state, representing lack of knowledge.
However, under DS theory, zero belief mass is
assigned to both states as there is no information to
determine whether the variable is true or false. We
have posited that in order for the auditor to be
biased, all the three variables, I, A, and O, must
be present. Thus, under the Bayesian framework
and under complete ignorance about the three
factors, a lack of evidence implies that the auditor
independence risk is 0.125. In other words, there
is only one possibility out of the eight potential
possibilities for formula (1) that all the three factors
are present.
Under DS theory, since we have zero belief mass
that the three factors are either true or false, we
obtain a zero belief that the auditor is biased or
not biased. This results in a plausibility of 1 that
the auditor could be biased, i.e., the auditor
independence risk is 1.0 compared to 0.125 under
the Bayesian framework. This implies that, given
no evidence, DS theory would indicate that a
high level of skepticism regarding auditor
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Figure 3: Auditor independence riska as a function of the strength of interrelationshipsb.
a Defined as plausibility (AIR(DS)) and as probability (AIR(Bayes))
b This graph assumes a high level of threat for incentives (I) and opportunities (O) and a low level of safeguards
for I and O. These levels translate into the following set of m-values: mI+ = 0 56. , mI− = 0 3. , mO+ = 0 56. , mO− = 0 3. .
No information is assumed to be available for attitude (A), m mA A− −= = 0.
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independence would be appropriate, whereas
Bayesian theory would indicate a much lower level
of concern.
In Figure 3 we assume there are safeguards
related to incentives and opportunities effective at a
moderate level. The effect of these safeguards result
in a definite belief that the auditor is not biased, i.e.,
Bel(~b) > 0, whether there are interrelationships or
not. Also, for this situation, the belief that the auditor
is biased is zero, i.e., Bel(b) = 0, because not all the
three factors are present for zero interrelationship
since we have assumed a zero belief mass that
the attitude is present. This results in a large
ambiguity at zero interrelationships. However, as
the interrelationships become stronger, the belief
that the auditor is biased increases, as does the
plausibility or risk that the auditor is biased and as
a result reduces the ambiguity. This reduction in
ambiguity with the increase in the strength
of interrelationships brings the measure of
independence risk closer to each other as seen
in Figure 3. One can show that as the level of any
threat increases, the assessed independence risk
also increases in a similar fashion under both
frameworks.
The effects of improved transparency
Section 202 of SOX mandates that audit committees
be directly responsible for oversight of the
engagement of the company’s independent auditor
and that the committee be informed about the
services expected to be provided by the audit firm
to understand whether the audit firm’s
independence will be impaired (OCA, 2007).
In this section, we demonstrate how the formulas
can be used to assess the impact of transparency
on AIR. Determining an appropriate amount of
transparency seems to be a continuing concern
of many participants in financial markets. To
demonstrate differences in perceptions as they
relate to evaluating the risk of impaired
independence, we program the two models in (1)
and (7) in a spreadsheet and then assign values
to belief masses obtained from various items of
evidence to calculate their effects on AIR.
As noted earlier, for an auditor to be assessed as
being independent from an audit client there must
be independence in appearance as well as in fact.
Thus, independence risk is based to a large extent
on stakeholder perceptions. Issues with respect
to perception arise from two sources. First, an
information asymmetry exists between the auditor
and any external parties evaluating an auditor’s
independence. That is, complete evidence about
threats and the effectiveness of safeguards is
probably not available to every party wishing to
evaluate AIR.
Second, while the auditor has a greater
knowledge about existing threats and the
effectiveness of safeguards, the auditor may
evaluate threats and safeguards with a bias
favorable toward him- or herself. Such asymmetry
of information and potential bias creates two
different perceptions of auditor independence –
the perception held by external observers having
incomplete information on which to base a
judgment and the perception held by the auditor
who has more information, but may evaluate that
information in a biased manner. The existence
of information asymmetry has been confirmed
by Maleszka & Monroe (2004) who find that
unsophisticated users, shareholders, sophisticated
users and auditors have significantly different
perceptions of auditor independence when
presented with identical scenarios.
Of the three nodes – Opportunity, Attitude, and
Incentive – external observers have only minimal
information in regard to the first two. For example,
in regard to Opportunity, auditors do not reveal
publicly the nature, timing, or extent of audit
procedures, nor do they reveal judgments made
in regard to the outcomes of those procedures.
Also, audit materiality is not disclosed nor is any
information regarding waived audit adjustments.
Thus, outside evaluators would be expected to
assign a higher value of belief that threats related
to Opportunity exist than would the auditor.
Accordingly, external observers must rely on the
effectiveness of safeguards such as those related to
the auditor’s compliance with generally accepted
auditing standards. The auditor, of course, has
complete information about these issues and may
have much greater confidence that independence
has not been impaired.
Information on which to evaluate the Attitude or
integrity of the auditor in regard to potential bias
also is very limited. In general, external observers
must rely either on the auditor holding an
appropriate certification and the certifying body
having appropriate standards for obtaining and
maintaining that certification or on regulatory
bodies to enforce independence rules. Information
about the ability of the auditor to resist
intimidation, his or her willingness to interpret
laws or principles, or cultural differences generally
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is unobservable externally. Of course, given a
professional attitude on the part of the auditor
and rational responses to intrinsic and extrinsic
influences, the auditor likely will evaluate his or her
own level of integrity at a high level.
To demonstrate how the AIR formulas can be
used to assess the impact of transparency and
associated perceptions, we use models (1) and
(7) and assign values to belief masses obtained
from various items of evidence. For analysis, we
consider all three interrelationships: a relationship
between Incentive and Attitude to compromise
(R1), a relationship between Opportunity and
Attitude to compromise (R2), and a relationship
between Incentive and Opportunity (R3). These
relationships are assumed to be at a medium
level of strength of 0.6, on a scale 0–1.0, i.e.,
r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.6 in DS theory and r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.714
under Bayesian theory (see endnote 5 for this
conversion).
The first panel in Figure 4 shows the assessed
independence risk based on the DS framework and
AIR under Bayesian Theory
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Figure 4: Auditor independence risk as a function of perceived effectiveness of safeguards against threats
related to incentives and opportunities for different levels of transparency and existence of regulations and
lawsa.
a See Table 2 for belief values.
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the lower panel shows the assessed independence
risk based on Bayes theory for differing levels of
knowledge concerning factors that influence
independence risk. In this figure, we first plot
the assessment of independence risk by a ‘naïve
observer’ who has very limited knowledge of
the nature of the profession, the policies and
procedures of audit firms, and/or of the
effectiveness of safeguards implemented by
regulators.
Since we assume for a ‘naïve observer’ there is
very limited knowledge that specific threats either
do or do not exist, we set the belief values related to
threats at relatively high levels, i.e., on a 0.0–1.0
scale, we consider 0.7 level of belief that Incentives
are present, 0.5 level of belief that Attitude is
present, and 0.7 level of belief that Opportunities
are present. We assume zero level of belief
for the negation of Incentives, Attitude, and
Opportunities.
The assumed values are shown in Table 2. In
addition, we set the effectiveness of safeguards
related to the auditor’s Attitude at a relatively low
level, say 0.2, under the DS framework. We then
vary the level of effectiveness of the safeguard
related to Incentive and Opportunity, from 0 to 1.0
in increments of 0.1. This circumstance is plotted as
‘naïve observer’ in Figure 4.
As can be seen, the naïve observer’s perception
of the risk of impaired independence is very high
when there is no belief in the effectiveness
in safeguards, but declines rapidly as this
effectiveness increases and rapidly approaches
zero with the perception of completely effective
safeguards.
In contrast, the auditor’s assessment of risk
likely will result in much lower beliefs that threats
exist and much higher beliefs that safeguards exist
and are effective. As shown in Table 2, to reflect
this view we set the belief values related to threats
at relatively low levels, i.e., we consider 0.4 level
of belief that Incentives are present, 0.2 level of
belief that Attitude is present, and 0.4 level of
belief that Opportunities are present. In addition,
we set the assessment of the effectiveness of
safeguards related to the auditor’s Attitude
at 0.9, a relatively high level. As with the
naïve observer, we then vary the level of
effectiveness of Incentive and Opportunity
safeguards from 0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.
This baseline is plotted as ‘Auditor’ for both
frameworks, DS and Bayesian, in Figure 4. Of
course, as previously noted, assessed belief values
or probabilities may result either from unbiased or
biased self-assessments.
Any difference between the plots of the ‘naïve
observer’ and the other plots provides an estimate
of the value of transparency; that is, the value of
communicating to naïve observers information
about the effectiveness of both the audit firm’s and
the regulator’s safeguards that are in place. Such a
difference also represents a potential ‘expectation
gap’ between the auditors self-assessment of
independence and an assessment made by
someone not fully cognizant of actual threats or
effective safeguards that may exist.
Independence risk: Plausibility of impaired independence 
Naïve observer: Plausibility of impaired independence as perceived by an observer having
minimal information about the relationship between the independent 
auditor and the audit client or about the effectiveness of safeguards 
affecting that relationship. 
Signaling: Plausibility of impaired independence perceived by an observer after 
increased signaling by independent auditor regarding nature of threats 
and the effectiveness of safeguards. 
Regulation: Plausibility of impaired independence perceived by an observer after 
increased signaling by the profession and regulators regarding nature of
threats and effectiveness of safeguards and after implementation of 
increased regulations and laws, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Auditor: Plausibility of impaired independence self-assessed by independent 
auditor. 
Figure 4: Continued
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Between plots for the naïve observer and for the
auditor, we plot the effect on AIR of additional
information communicated as the result of an audit
firm providing greater transparency concerning
audit firm-specific policies and procedures (plotted
as ‘Signaling’ in Figure 4). Examples of this type
of communication are provided in Houghton
& Trotman (2002, 2003), where KPMG Australia
provides significant additional information
concerning the methods it uses to help ensure
auditor independence and by KPMG International
in their KPMG’s Transparency Report (KPMGI,
2005). As shown in Table 2, to reflect this
circumstance we set the belief values related to
threats at lower levels than that for the naïve
observer, i.e., on a 0–1.0 scale, we consider 0.6 level
of belief that Incentives are present, 0.4 level of
belief that Attitude is present, and 0.6 level of belief
that Opportunities are present. In addition, we set
the effectiveness of safeguards related to the
auditor’s Attitude at a higher level, 0.4, than for
the naïve observer. As before, we then vary the
level of effectiveness of Incentive and Opportunity
safeguards from 0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.
These three plots demonstrate the value of
formal models in assessing independence risk and
more specifically the usefulness of signaling as a
means of reducing existing information asymmetry
between external observers and individual audit
firms. Such signaling may provide some comfort to
external observers in regard to how an audit firm
controls independence risk, thereby reducing the
belief that threats exist and increasing belief that
effective safeguards are in place.
The perceived effect of additional regulation
Our model may also be utilized to assess the effects
on independence risk of changes or differences in
the regulatory environment. For example, because
of specific restrictions contained in SOX and the
degree of publicity accorded the act, even naïve
observers may perceive that some threats, such as
providing lucrative non-audit services to clients,
have been eliminated and that effective safeguards
such as audit partner rotation will mitigate other
threats. As a result, increased knowledge of
threat reductions and safeguard implementations
Table 2: Belief values for Figure 4 assuming a medium level of interrelationships among the three factors
(r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.6 or r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.714)
Factors for which evidence gathered Basic belief masses, i.e., m-values
Threats related to Incentives in terms of
m-values in support of, against, and
ambiguity
Naïve observer: {0.7, 0.0, 0.3}
Signaling: {0.6, 0.0, 0.4}
Regulation: {0.5, 0.0, 0.5}
Auditor: {0.4, 0.0, 0.6}
Effectiveness of safeguards related to
threats pertaining to Incentives
Naïve observer: {*}
Signaling: {*}
Regulation: {*}
Auditor: {*}
Threats related to Attitude in terms of
m-values in support of, against, and
ambiguity
Naïve observer: {0.5, 0.0, 0.5}
Signaling: {0.4, 0.0, 0.6}
Regulation: {0.3, 0.0, 0.7}
Auditor: {0.2, 0.0, 0.8}
Effectiveness of safeguards related to
threats pertaining to Attitude
Naïve observer: {0.2, 0.0, 0.8}
Signaling: {0.4, 0.0, 0.6}
Regulation: {0.6, 0.0, 0.4}
Auditor: {0.9, 0.0, 0.1}
Threats related to Opportunities in terms
of m-values in support of, against, and
ambiguity
Naïve observer: {0.7, 0.0, 0.3}
Signaling: {0.6, 0.0, 0.4}
Regulation: {0.5, 0.0, 0.5}
Auditor: {0.4, 0.0, 0.6}
Effectiveness of safeguards related to
threats pertaining to Opportunities
Naïve observer: {*}
Signaling: {*}
Regulation: {*}
Auditor: {*}
*Varied from 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.
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required by regulation can substantially reduce
the plausibility and probability of impaired
independence as viewed by a naïve observer.
Figure 4 plots an assessment of independence
risk under both frameworks given that the auditor
actively signals regarding threats and the
effectiveness of safeguards to external observers
and that increased regulations and laws, such as
SOX, are implemented and publicized to external
observers (plotted as ‘Regulation’ in Figure 4). To
reflect this circumstance, we set the belief values
related to threats at lower levels than that for the
naïve observer with signaling by audit firms, i.e.,
on a 0–1 scale, we consider a 0.5 level of belief
that Incentives are present, a 0.3 level of belief that
Attitude is present, and a 0.5 level of belief that
Opportunities are present. In addition, we set the
effectiveness of safeguards related to the auditor’s
Attitude at a higher level, 0.6, than for the naïve
observer with signaling. These values are shown
in Table 2. As before, we then vary the level of
the effectiveness of Incentive and Opportunity
safeguards from 0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.
Although we illustrate possible differences in
Figure 4 based on our estimate as to what relative
degree various influences may have on perceptions
of the risk of impaired independence,
measurement of actual changes in beliefs is an
empirical question. Future research should focus
on the sensitivity of beliefs to such influences as
signaling by audit firms and promulgation of strict
regulations and laws by governing bodies.
While the above discussion presents the impact
of additional regulation on independence risk, it
is also important to recognize that perceptions of
the interrelationships and the Opportunity set may
be time dependent, i.e., they may change with time
and experience. For example, prior to the failed
audits of Enron by Arthur Andersen, regulators,
lawmakers, and other stakeholders may have
implicitly believed that interrelationships among
the three factors were not especially strong. Once
the failed audits became known, however,
regulators and lawmakers may have implicitly
perceived stronger relationships among these
factors.
Also, a stronger perception may have emerged
that auditors might be more likely to take
advantage of an Opportunity than previously
believed, i.e., there was an increased belief in an
inappropriate auditor Attitude. As a result,
perceived independence risk likely increased
dramatically with increased values for the
interrelationships and for higher values of the
belief in Attitude. It is possible that the US
Congress had similar perceptions about
independence risk and, when combined with
political pressures, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002. This new law is partially intended to
control independence risk by creating and
enforcing new and stronger safeguards. These
stronger safeguards may lead to lower
independence risk with a potential result shown
in Figure 4.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we present and illustrate two
analytical formulas for evaluation of risk of
impaired auditor independence. The presentation
of formulas based on both Bayesian Theory (BT)
and the theory of belief functions (BF) provides
alternatives to assess independence risk depending
on factors such as the feasibility of obtaining the
parameters needed to implement each approach
and the complexity of each formula. This paper
extends Turner et al. (2002) by taking a
threats-safeguards approach such as that included
in the international auditing standards and by
providing two analytical formulas for
independence risk for both negative and positive
evidence situations (i.e., evidence concerning both
threats and effective safeguards).
Independence risk is presented as a function of
six risk factors. Three of these risks relate to the
existence of threats to auditor independence: risk
that the auditor has Incentive to be biased in favor
of an audit client; risk that the auditor has an
inappropriate Attitude that may lead to such bias;
and risk that there are Opportunities for the auditor
to exhibit bias in providing the audit opinion. The
second three relate to the risk that effective
safeguards do not exist to control each of the
corresponding three risks arising from threats. For
the first time, interrelationships between the factors
that influence auditor independence risk are also
modeled and analyzed.
To provide additional insights into the usefulness
of analytical modeling, we assess independence
risk from two important viewpoints. The first
demonstrates the existence of a possible
‘expectation gap’ between external risk assessments
made by a ‘naïve’ observer, not having access to all
relevant information, and internal risk assessments
made by the auditor. In making an internal
assessment, the auditor has access to more
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information about threats and the effectiveness
of safeguards, but the assessment may be biased
in favor of the auditor. The substantial disparity
shown in Figure 4 between assessments by the two
parties indicates the potential value of signaling
of independence by auditors through greater
disclosure of how auditor independence is
maintained. KPMG Australia has attempted to
signal its level of independence with reviews
performed by Houghton & Trotman (2002, 2003).
KPMG International also has published a report
(KPMGI, 2005) which describes how the firm
monitors compliance with its policies and
procedures regarding independence and describes
the KPMG Independence Compliance System
(KICS) that facilitates monitoring of partner,
manager, and firm reportable investments. As
illustrated in this paper, the use of an analytical
model facilitates the quantification of the reduction
in the overall level of perceived independence
risk as the policies and procedures used to limit
independence risk become more transparent.
The second viewpoint demonstrates how
knowledge of additional effective external
safeguards, such as those resulting from changes
in regulations, may affect external observer
assessments. Figure 4 shows that implementation
of stringent regulations by governing bodies may
greatly impact the assessment of independence
risk.
While our examples demonstrate the potential
usefulness of our models for assessing the risk of
impaired independence, a number of questions
requiring empirical research remain. First, given
that auditors may not be considered totally
independent from their clients because of financial
ties through audit fees, one area requiring research
is to investigate the level of independence risk
acceptable both to regulators and to financial
statement users. Second, the Bayesian formula
presented here needs empirical research to assess
the probability potentials, conditional probabilities
and other probabilities included in the formula.
Similarly, the belief function formula requires
empirical research investigating how evidence of
threats and safeguards and the interrelationships
between those factors should be measured and
weighted. Third, both formulas imply that greater
disclosure by auditors can reduce the information
asymmetry between auditors and external
observers. This in turn, can reduce the appearance
of impaired independence. The nature and degree
of additional disclosures regarding audit program
decisions, materiality choice, and other issues
provide a fertile area for empirical academic
research. Finally, future research is needed to help
determine which approach, i.e., Bayesian or belief
functions, actually is more useful in practice. Until
these questions are addressed, recommendations
such as policy changes would be premature.
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NOTES
1. This relationship could also be expressed as ‘OR’
if we consider the negations of the variables,
which is expressed in mathematical terms as:
~b = ~i⁄~a⁄~o, where the symbol ⁄ represents
the union relationship.
2. Srivastava & Mock (2005) provide additional
justification as to why belief functions provide a
useful framework for these kinds of issues.
3. Here there are three likelihood ratios, lI, lA,
and lO, for factors I, A, and O, respectively.
These likelihood ratios are defined in terms
of conditional probabilities. For example,
lI = P(ETIESI|i)/P(ETIESI|~i), where ETIESI jointly
represent the evidence from threats and
safeguards pertaining to the variable I. Other
likelihood ratios are defined in similar ways.
4. m.+ represents the basic belief mass, i.e.,
m-value, in support of the variable denoted by
its subscript, m.− represents the basic belief mass,
i.e., m-value, against the variable denoted by its
subscript, and m.Θ represents the basic belief
mass, i.e., m-value, representing unassigned
belief. The sum of all the m-values assessed from
an item of evidence is always 1.
5. Cobb & Shenoy (2003) have proposed a
theoretically sound approach to convert
m-values in DS theory to probabilities in
Bayesian framework. In their approach the
normalized plausibility for each state of nature
represents the probability of the each state of
nature. For example, consider the following
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inputs of belief masses for a binary variable X:
m(x) = 0.7, m(~x) = 0.1, m({x, ~x}) = 0.2. For these
values, we have the following plausibilities:
Pl(x) = 0.9, and Pl(~x) = 0.3. When normalized
they yield the following probabilities:
P(x) = 0.9/1.2, and P(~x) = 0.3/1.2. We use this
approach to convert all m-values in DS theory
to probabilities and then to likelihood ratios
and strengths of relationships in Bayesian
theory. There is no transformation available for
converting probabilities to belief masses.
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